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Purpose: We herein  examine the private public partrnership (PPPs) 
in Malta by (i) ascertaining the nature and assessing their 
definability, (ii) identifying and analysing the main alternative ways 
of formulating PPPs and finding the optimal ways of doing so, as well 
as (iii) assessing PPP monitoring and analysing any factors which 
may render such monitoring more effective. 
Methodology: The study follows a qualitative mixed-methods 
design. It draws data from semi-structured interviews conducted 
with fourteen experts within the Maltese PPP scenario. These 
consisted of representatives from consultancy firms and from 
Government entities and private sector firms involved in PPPs. 
Findings: The findings indicate that, if a formal statutory PPP 
definition were to be adopted, this would likely face substantial 
resistance. Moreover, specific case studies and detailed risk 
assessments are sine qua nons for optimal PPP formulations. 
Furthermore, at the PPP contract drafting stage, dilemmas too often 
arise regarding the inclusion of the appropriate level of detail about 
the different aspects of such contracts if one is not to render them 
too complex. In SPs procurement, respondents preferred the 
inclusion of a pre-qualification stage. Furthermore, while it is 
generally agreed that further skills and resources are required for 
effective Government monitoring, differences of opinion emerged as 
to how and when such monitoring is to be performed.   
Originality/Value: This study is meant to raise public sector 
awareness on the need to improve Maltese PPP practices with 
respect to their definability, formulation and monitoring. It is hoped 
that the forwarded recommendations support the competent 
authorities in addressing the identified existing deficiencies, thus 
enabling them to enhance PPPs and render them improved vehicles 
for public sector development. 
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Different international organisations and authors have attempted to conceptualise 
the notion of PPPs. In fact, one such definition which is being taken as the working 
definition for this study, is:  
“Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are long term contractual arrangements between 
the government and a private partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public 
services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks.” (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2012, p.18) 
Psaila (2016) argued that the Government should not work on its own if the private 
sector has better capability. However, research regarding PPPs in Malta is limited. 
Consequently, this research paper attempted to achieve the following objectives:  
i. To ascertain the nature of PPPs in Malta and to assess their definability;  
ii. To identify and analyse the main alternative ways of formulating PPPs within 
the Maltese scenario and to find the optimal ways within such scenario; and  
iii. To assess the monitoring of current Maltese PPPs and to analyse the factors, if 
any, which may render such monitoring more effective.  
Literature Review 
The Definition and Nature of PPPs 
The definition of PPPs indicate that particular characteristics are present for the 
formulation of such partnerships. The UNECE (2008) and CEC (2004), claim that 
these partnerships between the public sector and the private sector usually: 
i. Are long-term in nature; 
ii. Involve the transfer of risk to the private sector;  
iii. May take different forms depending on the specificity of the case; and  
iv. Are financed by both private and public investments. 
In this context, Burnett (2007) argues that the lack of definition at law shall not 
discourage the proper use of PPPs and stated that defining PPPs would create 
unnecessary risk, as public parties would attempt to bypass transparency measures 
set out by public procurement regulation. 
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Nonetheless, the EC (2003) emphasised that the correct identification of the PPP 
structure is required before forming such a contract, given that PPPs can take several 
forms. The different types are categorised according to the amount of risk 
transferred to the private sector and the responsibilities retained by Government 
(UNECE 2008). A summary of the main types of PPPs is found in Figure below, where 
those forms placed at a higher level in the diagram indicate a greater degree of risk 
transferred to the SP.  
 
 








Figure Hata! Belgede belirtilen stilde metne rastlanmadı..1: PPP Models 
 
Source: Adapted from National Audit Office of Malta [NAO] (2015, p.29) 
All these models would transfer the responsibility to SPs, as identified in their name, 
while any other responsibilities remain with Government (UNECE 2008). According 
to the European Court of Auditors [ECA] (2018), DBFMO is the most popular type of 
PPP.  
The key point in relation to the nature of PPPs is that it is a contractual agreement 
between two parties, and thus, the terms can be tailored to the specific situation at 
hand (Farquharson, Torres de Mästle et al. 2011). Thus, the models described above 
are by no means an exhaustive list of PPP models but are models which are 
commonly used (EC 2003).  
 
 
Degree of Private Sector Risk 
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The Formulation of PPPs 
Justifying the Use of PPPs  
The first step, before starting to draft the PPP contract, needs to be one where 
Government considers whether a PPP is the best way forward for the project under 
consideration (PwC 2005). In fact, the OECD (2012, p.12) recommends that once 
Government decides to carry out a project, it should undertake a “procurement option 
pre-test” to identify that a PPP is a viable option. Thus, this necessitates Government 
to ascertain that a PPP will provide VfM in excess of that generated from other 
possible procurement methods (EC 2003). Moreover, Burnett (2007, p.103) argued 
that the decision to form a PPP “should be justified on a case by case basis”.  
Usually, a Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is employed in carrying out the VfM 
assessment where the discounted cost of the PPP plan is compared against that of the 
most adequate traditional form of procurement (ECA 2018, OECD 2012).  
However, the ECA (2018) criticised that most member states were not undertaking 
this initial assessment and stressed the potential future negative implications due to 
the PPP’s longstanding nature. In relation to the Maltese scenario, the NAO (2015) 
noted that two PPP contracts subjected to a performance audit (PA) did not consider 
other investment possibilities.  
Burnett (2007) argues that the motives behind forming PPPs are either to obtain 
private sector competencies of better overall quality and financial advantages 
resulting in an improved bottom line, or to overcome financing restrictions. The EC 
(2003) attributed these financing restrictions to a decline in the availability of public 
funds, or as a result of projects that require a substantial initial outlay. In fact, Psaila 
(2016) argues that certain large infrastructural projects would not be viable without 
a cash injection from the private sector.  
 Risk Identification and Allocation in PPPs 
After confirming that a PPP is the most beneficial option but prior to drafting the PPP 
contract, a detailed risk assessment (RA) needs to be performed where risks are 
identified and allocated (UNECE 2008). This step involves listing the risks and 
gathering those that are of similar nature, such as construction and operation risks, 
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in order to pinpoint the major risks on which to base allocation (World Bank [WB] 
2017).  
According to Deloitte (2006, p.5), Government should ensure that the risks of the 
project are assigned “to the party best positioned to manage it”. Therefore, the 
assignment of each risk should be rooted according to who has the best ability to 
control both probability and magnitude (Irwin 2007). However, Yescombe (2007, 
p.243) argues, that such party needs to do so “at the lowest cost” or else will 
undermine the VfM principle. In fact, UNECE (2008) stresses that for better 
governance, Government should accept a degree of risk or else it runs the possibility 
that in transferring all risks, the project becomes unfeasible. This is due to the notion 
that higher risk merits higher reward, which will be exercised by SPs (WB 2017).  
Drafting PPP Contracts 
Subsequently, there are two things to plan and execute. These are the drafting of an 
effective PPP contract and the procurement of the SP (Burnett 2007, Fenech 2005).  
The WB (2017) states that the PPP contract is a critical document for PPP 
formulation as risk is assigned through setting the responsibilities of both parties, 
performance requirements, a system of compensation and penalties, along with 
procedures to tackle disagreements, adjustment and termination, amongst others.  
Performance Requirements  
The performance requirements, which should be matched with performance targets, 
set out Government’s intentions and guide the SP (Burnett 2007). A crucial aspect of 
PPP contracts is that these requirements are established in respect of the amount 
and quality of the expected output, as opposed to specifying the inputs (WB 2017). 
This is an innovative feature when compared to traditional procurement contracts 
and helps Government to prevent monopolistic behaviour by prospective bidders, 
which in turn helps such bidders by providing a clearer picture, without restricting 
creativity (Farquharson et al. 2011, WB 2017). Farquharson et al. (2011, p.34) go on 
to argue that such requirements “should be SMART—specific, measurable, achievable, 
realistic, and timely” in order to add value to all parties involved and to aid in 
monitoring. Moreover, Burnett (2007, p.125) is of the same opinion, and most 
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notably writes “suppliers will tend to do what is measured”, motivated by the 
eventuality of penalties and thus aim to attain the prescribed targets.  
Compensation and Penalty Mechanisms  
The performance targets need to be the foundation for both Compensation and 
Penalty Mechanisms in PPP contracts and act as a “system of carrots and sticks” 
(Iossa, Spagnolo et al. 2007, p.33). Payment to SPs can take the form of a User-fee 
where the SP collects fees from end-users for using the product or service or an 
Availability-based mechanism, where the Government pays SPs for making the 
product or service available to end-users (Farquharson et al. 2011).   
In case of an Availability-based Mechanism, the payment could take the form of a 
Usage-fee, which is based on usage, or simply a Lump-sum Payment, which is based 
on availability (WB 2017). Alternatively, payment could be a combination of both 
User-fee and Availability-based mechanisms (Yescombe 2007). The choice is 
embedded in demand risk acceptance, since Availability-based PPPs impose a 
continuous obligation for payment on Government, while User-fee PPPs depend on 
end-user demand, hence a mixed approach might be beneficial (Farquharson et al. 
2011). Additionally, a cost for non-compliance with the contracted requirements 
needs to exist, which can take different forms, such as fines or a reduced 
compensation (WB 2017). All in all, the payment structure needs to be sufficient to 
cover costs and to motivate SPs but commensurate to the risk assumed (Iossa et al. 
2007).  
Dispute Resolution, Adjustment and Premature Termination Procedures  
Given the long-term nature of PPPs and the inability to precisely predict the future, it 
is essential to include both adjustment and dispute resolution mechanisms to allow 
for the necessary changes (WB 2017). Ergo, flexibility needs to be ingrained in PPP 
contracts, although this goes against the concept of a contract since its very purpose 
would be to reduce the ability to circumvent around it (Iossa et al. 2007). 
Nevertheless, Iossa et al. (2007) state that a balance between possible abuse and 
flexibility is vital and can be achieved by stipulating rules about what, when and how 
adjustment provisions may be triggered. An example is by factoring for inflation in 
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the Compensation Mechanism and tweaking the output requirements according to 
emerging trends (WB 2017). With respect to solving differences, a straightforward 
procedure should be in place, which can range from a non-binding assessment of 
selecting an independent person to settle disagreements, to referring the matter to 
the relevant regulator. Additionally, for more serious matters, one may resort to the 
judicial system, amongst other options (European PPP Expertise Centre [EPEC] 
2011).  
Furthermore, such contract will cease, either on an agreed date or earlier, due to 
default by either parties or unforeseen events. Consequently, provisions for 
returning the asset back to Government, and in case of premature termination a pre-
defined fee, ought to exist (WB 2017).  
The Procurement Process   
Another essential aspect in formulating PPPs is the procurement process, and 
according to EPEC (2010), it is crucial for PPPs to be successful. The purpose is to 
choose the SP to deliver the project’s goals, and thus, an important theme here is to 
encourage competition and transparency, hence developing a procurement strategy 
becomes a must (Farquharson et al. 2011).  
Pre-Qualification Questionnaire 
Another aspect is planning whether to use a one-stage process or a process that 
includes a Request for Qualification (RfQ) (WB 2017). According to Fenech (2005), in 
Malta, such a stage is referred to as the Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ). In a 
one-stage process, bidders submit a detailed proposal for immediate evaluation (WB 
2017). Conversely, in a process that includes a RfQ, interested parties are invited to 
register their interest by submitting a RfQ which needs to include information to 
corroborate their experience in the field and their financial and technical abilities 
(Yescombe 2007). Subsequently, such information is assessed by a procurement 
team and deficient applicants are rejected while the remaining bidders are invited to 
submit a detailed proposal for evaluation (Kerf, Gray et al. 1998). Farquharson et al. 
(2011) argued that including a RfQ is a fruitful exercise that results into a cost and 
time efficient procurement process and is recommended for sophisticated projects. 
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However, it may have a potential negative impact on competition and transparency 
goals. 
Final Bids and SP Selection  
Furthermore, Government needs to decide on a strategy to appraise the final bids in 
order to select the best one (WB 2017). Directive 2014/24/EU states that preference 
should be given to the “most economically advantageous tender” (MEAT) (EC 2014, 
art.67, par.1). This can involve either a two-tier or a weighted strategy but both 
strategies require the selection to be rooted in technical and financial criteria (WB 
2017). In a two-tier strategy, the bids first need to pass the technical criteria and 
then, if successful, proceed to financial analysis stage. In a weighted strategy, both 
technical and financial criteria are evaluated simultaneously (Kerf et al. 1998).  
The Monitoring of PPPs 
Following the successful implementation of a PPP, it is essential to introduce 
mechanisms to monitor and enforce the terms stipulated by the contract throughout 
its duration (WB 2017). Yescombe (2007) argues that in PPP arrangements, since 
SPs generally have better information than Government, a principal-agent conflict 
may arise.  
Skills and Resources in Monitoring PPPs  
The Government’s task to monitor PPPs is usually entrusted to a specialised team or 
individual that has the proper skill and resources. Thus, it is paramount to plan for 
this role before PPPs start to operate (WB 2017). Fenech (2005) stressed that for 
effective monitoring, resources need to be commensurate with the assessed risk 
presented by the SP. Furthermore, according to 4ps (2007), competencies need to 
include interpersonal skills, negotiation skills to settle conflicts, analytical abilities 
and experience on monitoring PPP contracts.  
Farquharson et al. (2011) described several helpful resources that may potentially 
aid in monitoring. These included hiring independent advisors which can be the same 
ones employed during formulation stage, providing adequate training to those in 
charge of monitoring, and creating a contract administration manual. The aim of such 
manual is for guidance purposes and it would need to focus on risk, and in detail, 
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describe the tasks and checks to be carried out (EPEC 2014). Furthermore, EPEC 
(2014) identified other necessary tools for effective monitoring which are a 
mechanism for obtaining valuable information about the PPP and an agreed financial 
model to calculate compensation due. Farquharson et al. (2011) wrote that PPP 
contracts should impose a duty on SPs to provide the requested information and to 
allow public authorities unrestricted access, even to audit. 
Key Performance Indicators and Other Tools in Monitoring PPPs 
The Global Infrastructure HUB [GIH] (2018) stated that Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) show the adequacy of the job being carried out by SPs, however, GIH (2018) 
claimed that the KPIs usefulness varies according to the payment mechanism used. If 
the payment mechanism is an Availability-based one, detailed KPIs are necessary, 
whereas if a User-fee Mechanism is used, KPIs are not important. This is because a 
User-fee Mechanism is within itself motivating to SPs, as if service quality declines 
end-users would stop using the PPP’s services and consequently results into lower 
revenue (GIH 2018).  
Additionally, PAs aid in monitoring as they are a third-party check that attempt to 
measure the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of PPPs (O’Leary 1996). In the 
Maltese scenario, the NAO (2015, 2017, 2018) has investigated a number of PPPs 
through PAs which in simple terms assessed whether the PPPs under review were “a 
good deal for government” (NAO 2018, p.16).  
A National PPP Unit  
Colverson and Perera (2012) wrote that many countries lack the experience required 
to obtain the capacity to formulate and monitor PPPs. Henceforth, the establishment 
of a nationwide PPP excellence centre, equipped to specifically deal with PPPs is 
considered as a beneficial investment (PwC 2005). The idea behind such Unit is to 
improve the PPP formulation process by employing skilled and experienced 
individuals who will drive and simplify the process by creating procedures and 
standardising the process based on best practises. Resulting benefits include a less 
costly and an accelerated tendering process, resolving legal and bureaucratic barriers 
and more useful monitoring (UNECE 2008).  




The Research Tool 
The research tool considered most suitable to collect data to achieve the research 
objectives of this dissertation was the semi-structured interview. When preparing for 
the semi-structured interviews, the researcher produces an interview schedule 
which includes both open-ended and closed-ended questions that address the 
research objectives, as well as some prompting questions to allow for a better 
discussion (Harrell, Bradley 2009). Semi-structured interviews allow respondents to 
answer more freely, and consequently, give the researcher the opportunity to get a 
deep understanding of the interviewees’ opinions. Nonetheless, since a standardised 
set of questions are used, data can be compared and statistically analysed 
(Macintosh, Morse 2015).  
The interview schedule designed for this study was intended for Public Private 
Partnership Experts. The interview schedule included three sections with both open-
ended and closed-ended questions. For the closed-ended questions, a five-point 
Likert Scale was used, with 0 being strong disagree/not important at all and 4 being 
strongly agree/ highly important.   
The Sample Population  
The target was to identify experts who were involved in the formulation and 
monitoring of PPPs. Capturing the consultants’ knowledge and experiences in 
advising clients on various PPPs was deemed as important, as was capturing the 
experiences of both Government and the private sector firm representatives 
involved. Fourteen interviews were carried out with deemed experts where six of 
which were with consultants, five of which were with involved Government Entities 
representatives and three of which were with involved Private Sector Firms 
representatives. 
Data Analysis  
Qualitative data was collected through both the open-ended questions asked during 
the interviews and through the interviewees’ remarks in justifying their ratings to 
the Likert scale questions. Such qualitative data was analysed by summarising the 
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transcripts of the responses for each question in the interview schedule. This allowed 
for easier evaluation and for the key similarities and differences in responses to be 
noted.  
Quantitative data gathered through the responses to the closed-ended questions in 
the interview schedule was analysed through IBM SPSS Statistics. The Friedman test 
was used for the Likert scale questions in order to compare the mean rating scores 
provided to the different statements in each question. The main purpose of this test 
is to assess whether the mean rating scores provided by interviewees to the 
statements vary significantly or not. Conversely, the Chi-squared test was used for 
the Yes/No questions to investigate the association between the two categorical 
variables.  
Research Limitations  
One of the main limitations was that contact was made with twenty known experts in 
the field which were referred to by various sources, including previous respondents. 
However, five refrained from responding despite multiple attempts by the 
researcher, while another potential interviewee refused to participate.  
Moreover, a degree of subjectivity was unavoidably present in responses provided by 
interviewees. Also, although limited, some inconsistencies were observed between 
the ratings given to Likert scale questions and other interview questions.  
Furthermore, in view of time and word restrictions, this study has been limited to the 
major important aspects relating to the PPP’s nature and definition, formulation and 
monitoring.  
Findings and Discussion  
The Nature and Definition of PPPs 
What are the PPP Characteristics? 
In the first question, interviewees were asked to rate their agreement with four 
characteristics of PPPs. Respondents strongly agreed that a PPP contract may take 
different forms(x̅=3.64) and agreed that a PPP contract is long-term(x̅=3.29), transfers risks 
to the private sector(x̅=2.86) and is financed by both sectors(x̅=2.50). Furthermore, a 
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significant difference(p=0.006) was found in respondent agreement with the different 
characteristics.  
Clearly, the nature of PPPs was understood by respondents to take different forms. 
Regarding whether or not PPP contracts are long-term, two respondents commented 
that it had to be so. By long-term, they assumed that it needs to be a period of 25 
years. However, two other respondents added that while still long-term, a ten-year 
term is ideal unless it needs to be extended for PPPs to be financially feasible. 
Regarding whether or not PPP contracts transfer risks to the private sector while 
agreeing, two respondents added that some risks are retained by Government. 
Another remarked that only operational risks are transferred while another stated 
that the degree of risks being transferred varies with Government’s intentions. 
Regarding whether or not PPPs are financed by both parties, three respondents, 
while agreeing, added that most PPPs are not equally financed, while one emphasised 
that PPPs are normally financed by Service Providers (SPs). 
Which are the Important Roles for Government and Service Providers? 
Interviewees were next asked to rate the importance of three proposed roles of 
Government and four proposed roles of SPs.  
Respondents found Government’s roles of setting the SPs’ requirements(x̅=3.93) and of 
monitoring the SPs(x̅=3.57) to be highly important, while Government’s role of 
providing assets(x̅=2.86) was deemed as important. This is in line with Burnett (2007) 
and EC (2003). Furthermore, the relative importance of the different roles was 
significantly different(p=0.000). As regards monitoring, two respondents added that 
such a function was at times provided by different branches of Government. As 
regards assets, three respondents added that such assets normally consisted of land. 
Respondents found the SP roles of deploying resources efficiently(x̅=3.93), supplying 
managerial skills(x̅=3.79) and adding end-users value(x̅=3.5) to be highly important and 
the SP role to finance projects(x̅=3.14) to be important. This is in line with Burnett 
(2007) and EC (2003). Furthermore, the relative importance of the different roles 
was significantly different(p=0.002). One respondent argued that whether or not 
resources are deployed efficiently depends on the original specification 
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requirements. For instance, efficiency declines if a continuing obligation to employ all 
present employees exists. Other interviewees stated that at times a further role of 
SPs is that of providing assets for the purpose of the project.  
Should Government be Partnering with the Private Sector?  
Interviewees were then asked whether it is better for Government to partner with 
the private sector rather than carry out the planned project itself. Nearly all 
respondents believed that it was better for Government to partner with the private 
sector. Eight added that this is because Government lacks the necessary expertise, in 
that, it lacks experience, innovation and efficiency. Furthermore, three respondents 
while still finding it better for Government to partner with the private sector 
emphasised that the benefit to Government was conditional on Government 
appropriately enforcing the contract and ensuring no detrimental consequences to 
the public.  
The only dissenting respondent stated that in his/her experience, it may not be 
beneficial for Government to partner with the private sector and for any benefits to 
materialise to Government, any PPPs need to be preceded by a careful study.  
Is the EU to Specify a Single Definition for PPPs? 
Interviewees were then asked whether they found the fact that there is no single 
definition of PPPs within the EU as being more advantageous than disadvantageous. 
While a number of respondents found such a lack of definition as being neither 
advantageous nor disadvantageous, more respondents stated that they found this 
disadvantageous. The reason given was that consequently, there are no clear EU-
wide parameters for PPPs across the EU, this leading to varying concepts about the 
nature of PPPs. As one added, the PPP term is thus “used loosely to mean many 
things”.  
Contrastingly, four respondents found the absence of a definition advantageous and 
stated that PPPs by their nature are undefinable as they require flexibility of form, 
creative and tailor-made solutions and reflect particular circumstances. Thus, there is 
“no one size fits all approach in PPPs” as whilst a model might work in one sector (e.g. 
health), it may not work in another (e.g. education). Furthermore, one respondent 
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argued that a tight definition would not improve governance, as there would be a 
tendency not to abide to this.  
Those who were neutral about the matter, reasoned that a definition is unnecessary 
but only when the concept works in practice, and one stated that PPPs are country 
specific and it would be futile to define on an EU level. Finally, one argued that such a 
definition was not a sine qua non one, as in practice, in PPP contracts one may insert 
an internal relevant working definition that clarifies the meaning of PPPs. 
Which Arrangements are Considered as PPPs?  
Interviewees were then asked which of the six arrangements fall within the 
parameters of a PPP. As shown, the response to the different arrangements was 
deemed to be significantly different(p<0.001). 
All respondents saw both DBFMO and BFMO as forms of PPPs while most saw Build-
Finance, Operation and Maintenance and Concessions as other forms of PPPs. 
Additionally, only three respondents saw Part Privatisation as another form of PPPs. 
Three respondents added that Operation and Maintenance resembles a form of 
procurement rather than PPPs, while five others noted that Concessions are a “light” 
form of PPPs although not considered as such by law and for statistical purposes. In 
effect, the only difference is that “in Concessions, the end-users rather than the 
Government pay for the service”. Contrastingly, those who did not see Concessions as 
PPPs, considered them as “closer to privatisation than PPPs”.  
As for Part Privatisation, those eleven in disagreement remarked that, while a 
relationship with the private sector exists, this is only tantamount to Government 
disinvestment and lacks the inherent characteristics of PPPs. Furthermore, two 
interviewees reasoned that what one considers as PPPs is “subjective” and that 
practical difficulties exist in classifying arrangements as PPPs.  
The Formulation of PPPs    
Should the Use of PPPs be Justified? 
Two proposed reasons for forming PPPs in Malta were discussed with interviewees.  
Interviewees strongly agreed(x̅=3.5) that SPs competencies of better quality and 
financial effectiveness is the main reason for forming PPPs in Malta. Moreover, three 
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added that such effectiveness commonly emanates from cost containment and better 
timeliness in project management. Nevertheless, another stated that this was so 
despite the fact that these competencies can be procured and not necessarily 
obtained through PPPs.  
Moreover, interviewees agreed(x̅=2.79) to the proposed reason of government’s 
unavailability of initial finance due to the capital outlays involved and/or 
Government’s reluctance or restrictions in financing by borrowing. One respondent 
stated that the unavailability of initial finance may be a reason for opting for PPPs in 
times of budget deficits and thus, the economic scenario is an important factor. 
Similarly, another added that EU rules require Government to include all the project’s 
cost on its Balance Sheet upfront and through PPPs, it could keep the cost off Balance 
Sheet. However, two respondents disagreed and explained that Government always 
managed to obtain the necessary funds. 
Respondents were then asked whether the launching of new PPPs needs to be 
justified by a specific case study, and twelve respondents agreed. One respondent 
added that without a case study, Government would be disadvantaged in 
negotiations with the private sector while another argued that a case study 
illustrates Government’s commitment to accountability and transparency. Those in 
disagreement stated that in certain sectors PPPs’ option has already proved 
successful and such a case study is only a bureaucratic exercise in the eventuality 
that the NAO performs an audit. Nevertheless, one suggested that a case study should 
be performed periodically and not for each PPP to ensure the concept’s validity.  
Furthermore, those respondents agreeing to a case study in the previous question 
were further asked whether a Public Sector Comparator (PSC) needs to be used in 
such a case study and nearly all agreed. The dissenting interviewee explained that 
the reasons why Government opts for PPPs are unmeasurable, this including the SP’s 
knowhow and competencies, and thus a PSC would not establish the facts. 
Finally, interviewees were asked about the extent to which such procedures are 
actually carried out in Malta. All respondents confirmed that a case study is prepared, 
three adding that it usually involves a cost-benefit analysis and the engagement of 
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independent consultancy firms. Yet, five emphasised that although “one cannot aspire 
for perfection”, improvements are needed as such studies are not comprehensive, are 
not sufficiently documented and too often are limited to a ticking box approach.  
Risk in PPPs 
Interviewees were asked how the Risk Assessment (RA) of PPPs is to be performed. 
Three respondents stated that brainstorming sessions need to be held so key risks 
are identified and subsequently mitigated through the PPP contract. Another three 
reasoned that a comprehensive RA needs to be made by both Government and SPs. 
Government needs to assess feasibility, probability of delays or non-completion and 
also whether public interest would be deteriorated, while SPs need to assess 
jurisdiction, financial and technical risks. Moreover, three others insisted that RA 
guidelines issued by various institutions such as EPEC have to be followed.  
Additionally, two respondents argued that an RA is to be made in two stages. First, 
inherent risks need to be assessed before Government finds the SPs, and then, any 
residual risks are to be reassessed prior to contract finalisation. This ensures that 
Government is not taken “lock, stock and barrel by SPs”. Furthermore, one suggested 
that the various risks are to be weighted, while another recommended that risk 
owners need to be appointed for each risk type. Finally, one mentioned political 
interference and corruption risks.  
Interviewees were then asked whether the RA is to consider who can manage the 
various risks at the lowest cost. All respondents confirmed this. However, a couple 
emphasised that better risk management involves higher costs, and so a balance 
needs to be found between the two.  
Interviewees were then asked what major risks Government needs to retain. Four 
respondents stated that it depends on the nature of the projects but retaining major 
risks could reflect adversely on Government’s Balance Sheet. They elaborated that if 
Government does not wish for the PPPs’ debt to be shown on its Balance Sheet “for 
statistical purposes”, then transferring all risk is important, but it would not obtain 
the best Value for Money (VfM). Moreover, another four respondents mentioned that 
Government needs to maintain risks relating to any project disruption (e.g. 
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earthquake). Similarly, another two stated that, in deciding, Government needs to 
consider the public interest, for instance, to ensure availability in old people’s homes, 
Government may take the demand risk upon itself. Furthermore, three explained that 
the price of shifting more risks to SPs is the higher return that will be required. 
Contrastingly, those three against Government retaining any risks emphasised that 
Government’s role is to be limited to monitoring as it is not so well equipped for risk 
management and internal control evaluation. 
Interviewees then were asked whether the above RA procedures are actually being 
employed in the formulation of PPPs, and twelve confirmed this. However, five stated 
that there is room for improvement as Government commonly lacks technical 
expertise. In fact, one stated that any RA being carried out is “informal, generally 
fragmented and limited”. Two respondents pointed out that this situation could be 
improved by having international experts providing training to Government’s 
personnel. 
What are the Main Aspects in Drafting PPP Contracts? 
Interviewees were next asked to rate their agreement with five main aspects 
(Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3) which are to be found in drafting PPP contracts. 
Interviewees strongly agreed to all aspects, in line with WB (2007). 
Furthermore, one respondent explained that assigning risks and responsibilities is to 
be the most important aspect, as PPPs often fail when there are “too many cooks” 
with no one overall in charge. Moreover, another added that, in drafting PPP 
contracts, one needs to determine the appropriate level of detail or, as stated, that of 
resolving the dilemma of “implementability vs. simplification”. In view of the difficulty 
in finding the “right balance”, Government may tend not to undertake the PPP.  
The Performance Requirements  
Interviewees were then asked to rate their agreement to three proposed reasons for 
limiting PPP requirements to the expected output and quality rather than to input 
specifications. Interviewees agreed to the three reasons, that is, that prospective 
bidders may be more creative(x̅=3.43), that a clearer picture is provided(x̅=3.00) and that, 
this helps the prevention of collusive behaviour by prospective bidders(x̅=2.50). 
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However, despite agreeing that creativity is enhanced, some respondents stated that 
basic input requirements are still to be stated to ensure quality (e.g. nurse-to-patient 
ratio in the health sector) and for the Government to be able to assess the different 
bidders. Moreover, two respondents emphasised the need not to limit inputs so that 
bidders may be allowed enough flexibility, a characteristic which is rare to find as 
permissible in public procurement. Another two were sceptical about either input or 
output restrictions helping to prevent collusive behaviour by prospective bidders.  
Next, interviewees were asked how performance requirements are normally set up 
in Malta. Four stated that performance requirements are formed by way of 
negotiations with SPs while one specified that these focus on timeframes, the service 
given and payments. In this connection, another respondent added that given Malta’s 
size, negotiations are needed, as initially, no one bidder tends to come forward to 
meet all Government’s requirements. Moreover, another four explained that the 
more experienced the Government personnel or their consultants are, the more 
improved, specific and detailed are the performance requirements. Two respondents 
stated that while requirements are in fact increasingly becoming performance based, 
they are as yet not being given enough importance. Finally, two pointed out that 
performance requirements are subject to standards imposed by the relevant 
regulator, if there are any (e.g. standards imposed by the Licensing Authority in health 
care). 
Thereafter, interviewees were asked how SMART output goals, if any, are being 
established. Nine respondents confirmed that such goals are normally being 
established, although there may be exceptions. However, one emphasised that 
SMART output goals do not always adhere to the specificity aspect. Another stated 
that whether or not output goals were SMART, varied with the competence of 
Government personnel responsible for drafting the contract. Contrastingly, those 
who disagreed stated that the goals which are being typically set are not really 
SMART. They only serve to induce Government to go “after numbers”.  
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Compensation and Penalty Mechanisms 
Interviewees were next asked to decide which is the superior Compensation 
Mechanism between an Availability-based Mechanism and a User-fee Mechanism. 
According to eight respondents it depends on the project under consideration as 
both mechanisms have their respective benefits. Half of these added that if 
Government wants to incentivise SPs to behave appropriately, demand risk must be 
transferred to SPs and thus a User-fee Mechanism would be needed (e.g. in a heritage 
site). Conversely, if Government wants guaranteed availability and financial stability, 
it needs to absorb demand risk and use an Availability-based Mechanism (e.g. in old 
people’s homes). Similarly, another respondent stated that SPs would request higher 
prices for the higher risk in User-fee Mechanism and thus, if Government is confident 
on demand, an Availability-based Mechanism would result in better pricing. Using 
similar reasoning, the remaining respondents concluded that an Availability-based 
Mechanism is superior. One respondent added that in Malta, the expectation in 
certain sectors (e.g. health and education) is that Government pays and not the end-
user. 
Furthermore, interviewees were asked whether the better type of an Availability-
based Mechanism is a Lump-sum Payment, Usage-fee or Other. Eight selected the 
Usage-fee type because it is motivating to SPs while Lump-sum Payments distort 
market prices. Even if the type of payment is Lump-sum, Government needs to be 
careful to limit such Lump-sum to two years or less as beyond that, it may not be VfM. 
On the other hand, another added that with a Usage-fee, Government keeps control 
and is able to investigate whether the PPP was loss-making. Contrastingly, three 
respondents were in favour of a Lump-sum Payment and argued that if such 
payments are given to end-users as opposed to SPs, it could result in “cost 
optimisation” as opposed to “cost minimisation” and a better service because such 
mechanism enhances competition. Three respondents were neutral about the choice, 
arguing that the type of mechanism chosen will depend upon whether a close link to 
performance is necessary. 
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Subsequently, interviewees were asked how far the performance targets are linked 
to compensation and penalty systems. They all remarked that, while such links are 
not consistently there, stronger links are being noted over the years in line with PPP 
evolution, especially in complex or service-oriented PPPs. Three respondents added 
that such link consolidation needs to progress in order to eliminate controversy, 
giving potential future examples such as bonuses to be awarded to SPs for exceeding 
expectations and, conversely, penalties for not meeting them.  
Interviewees were then asked about the typical safeguards and/or penalties in PPP 
contracts normally inserted for non-compliance and whether these are sufficient. 
Safeguards involved contingency plans guaranteeing service continuity, and 
Government making the first payment only after SPs have arrived at a certain stage 
in their operation. Penalties included monetary ones, one respondent specifying that 
these now range from €100 to €1000 a day, as well as the loss of performance 
guarantees, and the revocation of licences of non-compliant SPs, the latter being 
particularly in the health sector. Yet, twelve respondents pointed out that such 
safeguards/penalties are typically insufficient with five making an exception when 
Government personnel are knowledgeable enough. Two respondents emphasised 
that a proper safeguard would be a joint committee, which meets regularly to discuss 
any non-compliance and the reasons thereof.  
Dispute Resolution and Adjustment Procedures  
Interviewees were asked if dispute resolution and adjustment procedures are 
adequately inserted in Maltese PPP contracts. In relation to dispute resolution 
procedures, twelve confirmed that normally they are adequately inserted, with one 
respondent stating that most PPP contracts refer to arbitration. In relation to 
adjustment procedures, eight interviewees stated that improvements are needed 
while four stated that such procedures are already adequate. One, emphasising the 
need for improvement, explained that better adjustment procedures would benefit 
both parties as in PPPs Government typically pays a rate to SPs which includes both 
capital and operational expenditure. Over the years, operational costs often need to 
be updated while the capital expenditure portion is not always removed. Finally, two 
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respondents argued that the adequacy of both adjustment procedures and dispute 
resolution could be ensured by proper prior planning.  
Interviewees were then asked whether enough room is generally made for changing 
circumstances in long-term contracts. The matter is controversial as six agreed, 
others disagreed while two were neutral, the latter explaining that PPP “duration” 
actually varies with the “level of SP investment”. An interviewee upon agreeing, added 
that normally SPs exert enough pressure for an allowance to be made for changing 
circumstances. Contrastingly, two dissenting respondents added that irrespective of 
the initial contract, one cannot anticipate the future and it often results in insufficient 
room being made for changing circumstances. Consequently, as one added, addenda 
to PPP contracts are sometimes made.  
Pre-Qualification Questionnaires  
Interviewees were next asked to rate their agreement to three statements regarding 
Pre-Qualification Questionnaires (PQQs). Respondents agreed that a PQQ is required 
for sophisticated PPPs(x̅=3.45) and that PQQs lead to a cost and time-efficient 
procurement process(x̅=2.73) while they disagreed(x̅=1.18) that they undermine 
competition and transparency, with response to the three statements being 
significantly different(p=0.003). 
In relation to the first and second statements, two respondents added that PQQs are 
used for complicated projects so as to weed out potential financial and/or technical 
incompetent bidders immediately, while three others added that PQQs result in 
better standards but take more time. Furthermore, one added that PQQs may be 
completely avoided by including the necessary qualifications, thus excluding 
ineligible parties in the first place.  
As to whether the PQQ undermines competition and transparency goals, two 
respondents added that competition is still retained among the relevant bidders, 
although on a limited scale and that PQQs could lead to more contract abuse, 
although neither is this completely eliminated in a one-stage process. 
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Interviewees were then asked if PQQs are actually included in the PPP process in 
Malta and if so, how an applicant is accepted or rejected. Ten respondents confirmed 
that PQQs are used in Malta and with two adding that by such PQQs, a Government-
appointed committee obtains the needed preliminary information from prospective 
bidders prior to deciding on the necessary specifications. Five respondents added 
that this committee also assesses the bidders’ financial strength and experience 
based on the submitted technical and financial information. Moreover, one added 
that such PQQs mostly consist of yes/no questions (e.g. if in possession of a licence) in 
order to facilitate the elimination of the ineligible potential bidders.  
Interviewees were then asked whether they prefer a one-stage bidding process to a 
process which includes a PQQ. Ten respondents preferred a process which includes a 
PQQ, explaining that, for proper PPP contract drafting, PQQs need to be included in 
the first stage, owing to the complexity, size, and nature of bidders. However, one 
stated that s/he prefers a one-stage process. Moreover, another added that 
Government needs to engage market consultants rather than issuing PQQs.  
Final Bids  
Interviewees were then asked to describe how final bids are typically appraised and 
if any technical and financial criteria are commonly included. Eleven respondents 
remarked that the Most Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT) system is used. 
The MEAT is either the cheapest technically compliant bid, or the bid with Best Price 
Quality Ratio (BPQR). The cheapest technically compliant bid refers to bidders 
having first to meet the technical criteria and, if not eliminated on such ground, they 
will then compete for the cheapest bid. On the other hand, the BPQR takes a weighted 
approach between financial and technical criteria. Two added that in BPQR, either 
the 70:30, 60:40 or, in rare cases the 80:20 ratios are used, but more importance is 
consistently allocated to the technical criteria. Additionally, four respondents 
emphasised that, in assessing quality under the BPQR, maximum scores need to be 
predetermined and specified in tender documents so as to eliminate subjectivity. 
Furthermore, one elaborated that BPQR is mostly used for PPPs.  
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Three respondents explained that a committee composed of different professionals 
appraises the bids. Moreover, one suggested that such committee members need to 
be different from those who had prior contact with the bidders so as to eliminate 
potential conflict of interest. Finally, three respondents mentioned that technical 
criteria vary with the project under review. For example, in old people’s homes these 
could include the quality of food, activities that may be offered and other living 
conditions.  
Are Maltese PPPs Commonly Well-formulated?  
Interviewees were then asked whether, in their view, PPPs in Malta are commonly 
well formulated. Thirteen replied that PPPs are satisfactorily formulated but that 
there is room for improvement, with six respondents specifying that there are as yet 
deficiencies in Government knowhow and monitoring as well as in the regulatory 
framework. One also referred to the need to deal with the persisting negative public 
misperceptions of PPPs which ignore their economic benefits. However, another one 
considered PPPs as being very well formulated.  
The Monitoring of PPPs 
Skills and Resources in Monitoring PPPs 
Interviewees were then asked to rate the importance of five proposed major skills in 
effective monitoring. A significant difference(p=0.005) emerged in the rating scores of 
the importance of these skills.  
Respondents found negotiation skills to settle conflicts as highly important(x̅=3.79) 
while analytical abilities(x̅=3.43), interpersonal skills(x̅=3.14), international 
experience(x̅=3.14) and Maltese experience(x̅=3.14) on PPPs were found to be important. 
As regards PPP experience, one added that while Maltese experience is important, it 
is as yet lacking.  
Subsequently, interviewees were asked to rate their agreement to five resources 
which aid in monitoring.  
Respondents strongly agreed that adequate training to those in charge of 
monitoring(x̅=3.79), an agreed mechanism for obtaining valuable information(x̅=3.71) and 
an agreed financial model to calculate compensation(x̅=3.57) aid in monitoring. 
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Furthermore, two emphasised the importance of having pre-agreed mechanisms and 
models as “judgements have to be based on facts” and added that PPP contracts need 
to include clauses which allow Government entities to access SP records for auditing 
purposes. Moreover, respondents agreed that both hiring independent advisors(x̅=3.36) 
and creating a contract administration manual(x̅=3.36) aid in monitoring. One added 
that independent advisors are normally important, however only as long as 
Government lacks the necessary insource expertise. Finally, another one added that 
in his/her view, any contract administration manual could not be comprehensive in 
view of the uniqueness of each PPP. 
Interviewees were then asked how Government ensures that relevant information, 
known by SPs, is sufficiently transmitted to it. Eight respondents stated that PPP 
contracts oblige SPs to provide Government with such information, but this does not 
ensure that such transmission is actually affected. Two specified that there is the 
need for a more comprehensive list and timing of the types of information to be 
required by Government for better monitoring, including items such as maintenance 
spending and monthly reports. Additionally, others suggested that Government 
needs to retain the options of different audits over the duration of PPPs. 
PPPs Monitoring – How, Who and When? 
Interviewees were asked about how, who and when is monitoring of PPPs typically 
being carried out. Four explained that these aspects vary with different PPPs. With 
regards to how, references were made to inspection, following terms of references 
designed in PPP contracts, and to the use of operational and financial KPIs. With 
regards to who carries out monitoring, reference was made to the Government entity 
ultimately responsible for the delivery of the PPP. However, four referred to engaging 
an outsourcer if technical knowledge is lacking, which commonly is the same one 
who sets up the PPP’s original performance requirements. With regards to when, 
respondents explained that monitoring varies from being affected monthly to 
annually, at each stage of the PPPs, at times this simply preceding the periodic 
payments to SPs. 
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Are Performance Audits Beneficial in PPPs? 
Interviewees were asked whether Performance Audits (PAs) are relevant in 
determining whether or not PPPs have been successful. All respondents confirmed 
such relevance, with one( adding that PAs often indicate any deficiencies both on the 
part of Government and the SPs. Five added that such PAs are currently carried out 
by the NAO but may also be carried out by external consultants, the Internal Audit 
and Investigations Department or the Contracting Authority.  
The Need for a National PPP Unit 
Finally, interviewees were asked whether a national PPP Unit is needed to help 
improve PPPs. Ten confirmed that such a Unit would be beneficial. Nine argued that 
as long as it is staffed by technically competent and experienced people, such a unit 
would help improve the regulatory framework, harmonise the whole process, specify 
the fundamental principles to form and operate PPPs and ensure that PPPs are no 
longer formulated by different ministries or other public sector entities. They also 
added that a separate section of such a Unit could act as a regulator. Contrastingly, 
two respondents stated that, in the first instance, a robust PPP framework needs to 
be drawn up. Another two stated that there are too few PPPs for the setting up of a 
new Unit to be justifiable. 
Discussion 
Oxygenating PPPs: Determining their Nature and Definition 
Are PPPs by Nature Definable? 
As has been seen Maltese PPPs take different forms, are long-term with a period 
ranging from ten to 25 years, transfer risks to the private sector and are financed by 
both sectors but not consistently to equal proportions. Such characteristics are in line 
with the literature.  
Moreover, practical difficulties clearly exist in classifying arrangements as PPPs and 
what one considers as a PPP is “subjective”. In fact, arrangements which are mainly 
considered as PPPs include DBFMO, BFMO, Build-Finance, Operation and 
Maintenance and Concessions. Yet, not all arrangements are viewed to be on the 
same scale, as Concessions are viewed as a “light” form of PPPs. Thus, it would 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 7/1 (2021): 1-39 
 
 26 
probably be beneficial if the PPP term is clarified, especially since Concessions have 
been found to be separately identifiable for statistical purposes.  
The CEC (2004) stated that the PPP term is not defined at the EU statutory level and 
the findings indicate that it is mainly disadvantageous. This is because, in the absence 
of a definition, the lack of EU-wide parameters induces misunderstandings and 
misperceptions. As a result, the PPP term tends to be inconsistently used by different 
consultants with reference to the same arrangements. Yet, the lack of a definition 
may be advantageous as PPPs by their nature require flexibility of form as well as 
creative and tailor-made solutions that may be constrained by a PPP definition. 
Therefore, a “one-size fits all approach” may not work in all sectors and consequently 
gives rise to situations where professionals try to find ways so as not to adhere 
strictly to such a definition. Consequently, it may be more beneficial if Government 
provides guidance on a non-legally binding PPP definition. This would allow for the 
formation of an internal working definition that is specific for each PPP.  
 Fuelling PPPs: Formulating their Course 
The Preliminary Justification – Is it Worthwhile? 
Burnett (2007) contended that a reason for forming PPPs are SP competencies, 
which include better quality products and financial effectiveness. Such a reason is 
also found to be a major one applicable in Malta. Yet, such competencies do not in 
themselves justify the formulation of PPPs as these can be alternatively obtained 
through public procurement. Moreover, as also contended by the EC (2003), the 
findings indicate that the formation of PPPs may be a way for Government to solve 
the unavailability of its initial financing, particularly in times of Government budget 
deficit. Therefore, the country’s economic scenario may play an important role in the 
decision to form PPPs. 
As recommended by PwC (2005), the first step in optimally launching each PPP is to 
justify such a decision by undertaking a specific case study. This has also been 
confirmed by the findings. These have pointed out that, in the absence of such a 
study, Government will lack transparency, effectiveness in negotiations with SPs and 
VfM. Nonetheless, if in the past, the PPP option had already proved to be successful in 
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certain sectors, the undertaking of such an exercise may turn out to be merely 
bureaucratic and ritualistic and therefore not add any value. One proposed solution 
to such a dilemma was that, in such instances, one may limit case studies to some 
dubious PPPs rather than to all of them. Yet, Burnett (2007) argued that each PPP 
needs to be individually justified and therefore, the matter is not that simple. The 
claim is probably true that the PSC, as recommended by ECA (2018) and OECD 
(2012), may not capture why a PPP is the better option. Yet, undertaking such a study 
would make it possible to include considerations such as whether the PPP is in the 
public interest, whether asset regeneration may be improved by it and whether the 
PPP may give rise to more opportunities for irregularities. Therefore, the indication 
in the findings that there are more case studies currently being conducted in Malta 
than before, marks an improvement from the situation, as described earlier by NAO 
(2015) and ECA (2018). This is because undertaking such case studies for each PPP is 
probably a sine qua non if Government is to be helped to ensure appropriate 
decision-making. Of course, it needs to also be ensured that the quality and 
documentation backing such studies are of the appropriate level, which does not 
seem to be as yet the case. 
The Risk Assignment – Is it Too Burdensome on Service Providers?  
In line with UNECE (2008) and WB (2017), the findings indicate that a detailed RA 
needs to be performed to identify and allocate key risks by following RA guidelines 
issued by institutions such as EPEC. For optimal formulation, brainstorming sessions 
need to be held by both Government and SPs in order to identify their risks. 
However, the focus of each party needs to be different. Government needs to give 
priority to public interest, assessing the risks of project non-completion or delays, 
and of political interference or corruption. On the other hand, SPs need to assess 
their operational and financial risks.  
Moreover, the study indicates that, in order to ensure appropriate PPP formulation, 
Government may best perform the RA in two stages. The first stage is before 
choosing the SP where the Government assesses the inherent risks. The second stage 
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is prior to contract finalisation and involves the reassessment of any residual risks in 
order to verify that the PPP deal is actually beneficial to Government. 
Furthermore, a major question arises as to whether Government needs to retain 
some risks in each PPP. Yescombe (2007) and UNECE (2008) emphasised the need 
for this, and the study also confirms that this is acceptable in Malta on the basis that 
the more risks transferred to SPs, the higher the return that will be required by them. 
Evidently, considerations as to whether all risks are to be transferred to the SP are 
not to be influenced by whether or not a PPP’s debt is to be off the Government’s 
Balance Sheet - as claimed by some respondents74 to have been frequently the case in 
the past - but rather by whether the transfer of all such risks would result in VfM and 
the public interest. An example of such public interest is the absorption by 
Government of demand risks in the case of old people’s homes so as to ensure 
sufficient availability.  
Therefore, a consistent policy of passing all the risks to SPs may not only be 
detrimental to Government but also too burdensome for some potential SPs to come 
forward to undertake the PPP. Yet, the decision to retain some risks in particular 
PPPs to result in VfM and in the public interest also hinges on the technical ability of 
the Government’s side to manage those risks itself. In this regard, results74 indicate 
that Government personnel need to improve their technical ability and that possibly, 
this may be done through the provision of training by experts with the appropriate 
international experience. Another condition which one may consider for appropriate 
risk retention by Government is for it to appoint specific risk owners for each type of 
retained risk. 
The Contract Drafting – Is it Appropriate for Easy Implementation?  
The findings indicate that optimal PPP formulation requires someone to be 
responsible for the whole process. Furthermore, those drafting the contract clauses 
of each PPP need to face the dilemma of specifying the nature and detail that such 
clauses are to have for easier interpretation and implementation at a later stage. The 
main aspects to PPP contracts, indicated hereunder, deliberate on this dilemma. 
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Performance Requirements – Input-based or Output-based?  
As stated by WB (2017) and Farquharson et al. (2011), PPP performance 
requirements are to be based on quality and expected output, as opposed to input, as 
this allows prospective bidders to be creative in achieving the end goals. The local 
findings are in line with such literature. Yet, it must be kept in mind that basic input 
requirements also need to be stated, as otherwise, quality may tend to easily and 
unobtrusively decline, and thus Government may find it difficult to assess the 
different bidders. However, such requirements need to be kept simple if SPs are to 
have enough room for operational flexibility for implementation.  
Indications have also emerged that performance requirements are normally 
“SMART”, as suggested by the literature. Yet, more qualitative output-based 
requirements need to be developed at the drafting stage. Government needs to avoid 
blind adherence to quantitative performance requirements and refrain from 
assuming that the PPP would be on its way to optimal formulation if quantitative 
targets are attained. Here again, issues seem to arise as to the competence of 
Government’s personnel in PPP formulation.  
Furthermore, whenever performance standards are regulated in the industry, these 
are often automatically inserted in the drafting. However, the absence of such 
regulations will normally lead to the resetting and clarification of such performance 
standards at a later stage by way of negotiations with SPs because no one bid offer is 
then found to have met all of Government’s initial requirements as drafted. Such 
negotiations may possibly have to include timeframes, service delivery and 
settlement of payments. 
Compensation and Penalty Mechanisms – Availability-based or User-fee? 
As described by the literature, PPP Compensation Mechanisms can generally take 
either the form of an Availability-based Mechanism or a User-fee Mechanism. 
However, neither mechanism is perceived to be superior in Malta as each lends itself 
to different Government objectives, with the actual choice varying with the question 
of which of the two parties – Government and SPs – is to take on the demand risks. 
When the Government objective is to guarantee availability of service and to ensure 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 7/1 (2021): 1-39 
 
 30 
that the PPP remains financially stable, it typically takes over such demand risks by 
opting for the Availability-based Mechanism. On the other hand, a User-fee 
Mechanism is better suited to Government when its objective is to induce SPs 
towards appropriate behaviour. However, in the latter mechanism, the end-user, 
which may be the Government itself, will have to pay a higher price in view of the 
higher risk assumed by SPs. It therefore follows that if Government is confident that 
the PPP outputs will be subject to consistent demand, it is more economical for 
Government to opt for an Availability-based Mechanism, as this typically results in 
better pricing. In addition, the User-fee Mechanism may have limited practical use in 
Malta, as in most sectors, particularly in health and educational services, the 
perceptions are that public goods are to be funded by Government rather than end-
users. 
Moreover, as described by the WB (2017), an Availability-based Mechanism may take 
the form of either a Lump-sum Payment or a Usage-fee. A Usage-fee mechanism is 
probably more preferable in Malta as it is more motivational to SPs. Furthermore, it 
has been found that it is difficult for both parties to set a reasonable Lump-sum 
Payment for beyond the first two years of the PPP and that this will probably have to 
be revised biennially. Therefore, the obvious disadvantages arising from such 
mechanism are that both parties may either have to periodically go back to the 
negotiating table or are to accept the risks of drastically changing end-user demand. 
Additionally, for optimal formulation, a “system of carrots and sticks” as described by 
Iossa et al. (2011) warrants serious consideration. This is because, with such a 
system, additional compensation in the form of bonuses is to be awarded if 
performance targets are exceeded. Conversely, penalties are to be levied when such 
targets are not reached. However, the indications are that in Malta the typical 
safeguards and penalties normally inserted for non-compliance are insufficient, this 
again probably being due to the prevailing lack of expertise on the part of 
Government. Furthermore, despite their insufficiency, such safeguards (including 
contingency plans and guarantees of first payment timeline) and penalties (including 
loss of performance guarantees and licence revocation) are implemented in the case of 
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some but not all PPPs and therefore it may be optimal if such safeguards and 
penalties are applied in all cases. 
In view of the above issues, it would probably also be beneficial if in the PPP contract, 
arrangements are made for periodic meetings between the Government and the SP. 
Thus, both parties can be sure of meeting regularly to discuss any arising issues, 
particularly with respect to those impinging on safeguards and penalties. 
Dispute Resolution and Adjustment Procedures – Are They Ever Sufficient? 
EPEC (2011) stated that a straightforward dispute resolution procedure needs to be 
in place. In Malta, such a procedure typically takes the form of arbitration rather than 
court action. In contrast, adjustment procedures are not as well established, this 
sometimes emanating from inadequate planning on the Government part. In this 
connection, Iossa et al. (2007) stated that PPP contracts need to provide for flexibility 
and that this may be done by including rules about what, when and how adjustment 
procedures are to be triggered. However, the need for such adjustment procedures 
stems from the fact that PPPs are typically long-term. This is important because, in 
ensuring that the interests of Government and SPs are aligned, PPP duration needs to 
vary with the level of SP investment. As a result, it is difficult at the outset to allow 
sufficient room for changing circumstances, despite the attempts of SPs in this 
direction. 
 The PPP Procurement Process – Can it be Homogenous? 
The Pre-Qualification Questionnaire – Is it Sufficiently Transparent and 
Invariably Needed? 
According to WB (2017) and Fenech (2005), Government has to decide whether to 
include a stage involving a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ) as part of the PPP 
procurement process. By means of such a PQQ, a Government-appointed Committee 
assesses the necessary preliminary information submitted by prospective bidders 
through a number of predetermined questions. In line with Yescombe (2007) and 
Kerf et al. (1998), such information may be both technical and financial and therefore 
expedites the comparative assessment of the financial strengths and experiences of 
the various prospective bidders. In such an assessment, the Committee is also known 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 7/1 (2021): 1-39 
 
 32 
to exclude details relating to the project design. The acquisition of such information 
may indeed be highly relevant for optimal PPP formulation. Yet, for the sake of 
transparency, it would probably be better if the questions themselves are not only 
predetermined but possibly also closed and dichotomous, although still permitting 
the possibility of additional comments by the respondents. 
The indications are that this pre-qualification stage is preferred as a requirement for 
all sophisticated PPPs, this being in line with Farquharson et al. (2011). Such a 
requirement would ensure the immediate exclusion of those prospective bidders 
who are clearly unequipped in terms of their size, complexity and nature. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that, if appropriately implemented, the PQQ 
would not only render the process more efficient but would also not bear the 
disadvantage claimed by Farquharson et al. (2012) of materially undermining 
competition and transparency goals. 
On the other hand, with unsophisticated PPPs, it may be beneficial to engage market 
consultants in lieu of implementing a PQQ. In this case, such consultations may be 
enough to ensure their optimal formulation. 
The SP Selection – A Two-tier or a Weighted Approach? 
The bidder is selected, in line with Directive 2014/24/EU, WB (2017) and Kerf et al. 
(1998), on the basis of who presents the MEAT. In fact, this may involve one of two 
approaches, both based on financial and technical criteria - the two-tiered approach 
or the weighted one (the BPQR) - the latter being preferred and more used for PPPs 
in Malta, as it gives importance both to price and, in varying degrees, to technical 
criteria. However, the implementation of BPQR may have its dangers of subjective 
assessment with respect to quality. Thus, implementation would be easier if, prior to 
the issue of the tender document, maximum scores are predetermined to the various 
quality aspects. A further safeguard in ensuring objectivity may be that of having 
different members in the committee evaluating the final bids from those involved 
earlier in the procurement process. 
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Heating PPPs: Monitoring their Development 
What Resources and Skills are Needed for Effective Monitoring?  
According to the literature, Government needs to effectively monitor PPPs to ensure 
that the agreed contract terms are being adhered to. This importance was confirmed 
in the findings, and in line with NAO (2018) and 4ps (2007), effective monitoring 
ensures the issue of early warnings, the protection of the public interest and the 
motivation and appropriate compensation to SPs. Thus, the question might arise as 
to what resources and skills are required to ensure that such monitoring is effective. 
The major skill required in effective monitoring is the ability to negotiate in order to 
settle conflicts. Additionally, in line with 4ps (2007), analytical abilities, 
interpersonal skills and experience on PPPs are considered important in effective 
monitoring. Moreover, both international and also the limited Maltese experiences on 
PPPs are considered relevant.  
With respect to resources, Farquharson et al. (2011) and EPEC (2014) identified 
various resources in order to aid monitoring. Adequate training to those in charge of 
such monitoring is the most essential resource for effectiveness. Moreover, an agreed 
mechanism to objectively obtain valuable information, as well as an agreed financial 
model to calculate compensation also seem to be considered as important resources. 
Thus, Government entities need to have unrestricted access to SP records and to be 
able to conduct relevant audits. In this connection, the study confirms that specifying 
this in PPP contracts is not enough, as a comprehensive list and timing of types of 
information is to be required. Furthermore, other resources which could aid 
monitoring include hiring independent advisors and creating a contract 
administration manual. Yet, the latter may never be comprehensive given the 
uniqueness of each PPP.  
Therefore, it would probably be helpful that, during PPP formulation, Government 
also prepares for the subsequent monitoring phase and accordingly plans for skilled 
personnel and the necessary resources. This could possibly be achieved through 
outsourcing the monitoring function, with such outsourcing possibly being open for 
international firms outside the EU. Moreover, it may be beneficial if provisions are 
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made for SPs to be charged for the cost of enhanced monitoring wherever they are 
uncooperative. 
Can There be a Consistent Approach as to How, Who and When Monitoring is to 
be Carried Out?  
As identified by WB (2017), Government is tasked with monitoring PPPs, but, how, 
by whom and when is monitoring carried out so as to ensure that it is effective? The 
findings indicate that these three aspects are not consistently applied within 
different PPPs.  
In terms of the how, references are typically made to the relevant PPP contract’s 
terms of reference, inspections and KPIs, the latter being developed for the purpose 
of monitoring each specific PPP. Yet, the extent of detail varies among the various 
PPPs and consequently these need to be improved. In line with GIH (2018), such 
improvement may be affected through better links to the compensation mechanisms.  
In terms of the who, monitoring is to be the responsibility of the Government entity 
ultimately responsible for the delivery of the PPP, if need be with the help of 
outsourced services.  
Furthermore, in terms of the when, this may vary from being carried out at 
predetermined separate stages of PPPs to being carried out periodically, say on an 
annual basis.  
In this manner, effectiveness is likely to be enhanced if an overall consistent 
approach is agreed for all PPPs. A possible way of ensuring consistency is for a 
Monitoring Committee to be established to meet regularly and to identify those 
responsible for implementing the necessary decisions.  
Is the NAO the Appropriate Authority to Conduct Performance Audits?  
Over the years, the NAO (2015, 2017, 2018) has carried PAs to measure the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of PPPs. It seems that such PAs are relevant for effective 
monitoring, especially in highlighting deficiencies. However, it may be beneficial if 
other bodies, such as external consultants, the Internal Audit and Investigations 
Department or the Contracting Authority also conducts similar audits. More studies 
may be required in this regard.  
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A National PPP Unit – Is There a Role for It?  
The overall indications are that a tighter regulatory framework is called for in order 
to ensure improvements in the formulation, operation and monitoring of PPPs, this 
being in line with Colverson and Perera (2012). Such a framework may include the 
following:  
a. the setting up of a separate and independent national unit responsible for 
PPPs (“National PPP Unit”) with its two main functions being that of 
regulating all PPPs by establishing guidelines for their formulation and that of 
monitoring their operations so as to ensure the implementation of such 
guidelines. The functioning of such a Unit could thus eliminate any current 
need of other public sector entities to form their own PPPs without any 
benchmarks; 
b. the harmonisation of the whole PPP process by clear provisions as to which 
arrangements are to be considered as PPPs and by the inclusion of the 
fundamental principles of formulation, operation and monitoring of such 
PPPs;  
c. the requirement that such a Unit as specified in (a.) will be managed by a 
variety of professionally qualified personnel. Furthermore, it is to take on the 
task of publishing justifications in the public interest for the launching of any 
new PPPs. One example of such justification may be that of the regeneration of 
idle Government assets for the derivation of economic benefits.  
Conclusions 
This study concludes that in Malta, PPPs are commonly well formulated and 
monitored. Yet, there is clearly still room for improvement. In this respect, one main 
contributor to the existing deficiencies in both formulation and monitoring is the 
insufficient level of expertise of Government personnel in both processes. Other 
factors contributing to such deficiencies include the lack of a specific regulatory 
framework for PPPs and the related absence of a central procurement authority. 
Furthermore, the study concludes that well-conducted preliminary case studies are 
necessary to determine the feasibility of PPPs for the sake of transparency, effective 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 7/1 (2021): 1-39 
 
 36 
negotiations and VfM. However, while such case studies are generally being 
conducted in Malta, the danger is that these may at times turn out to be merely 
ritualistic exercises. Furthermore, with respect to RA exercises, the tendency is for 
these not to be exhaustive, thereby resulting in risks being transferred to SPs which 
may be too burdensome and not necessarily value-adding in the public interest. 
Additionally, in the drafting of PPP contracts, there is as yet the need to establish 
qualitative and basic input requirements in addition to the current output-based 
performance requirements set out by way of negotiations. It may also be concluded 
that while an Availability-based Compensation Mechanism results in better pricing 
and seems to be more appropriate for Malta, it may need to be subjected to revisions 
later in the contract period. In this connection, safeguards and penalties which are 
originally planned at the setting out of the contract, too often turn out later to be 
difficult to implement with consistency. Added on to this, while pre-set adjustment 
procedures may be difficult to determine at the outset, more emphasis on them is 
clearly needed to ensure long-term alignment of Government and SP interests. As for 
provisions relating to the premature termination of PPP contracts, more detailed 
transition plans are needed, despite the fact that such occurrences may be rare. 
Moreover, in the Maltese PPP procurement strategy, PQQs have their place and may 
often, although not always, need to be utilised in view of the complexity, size and 
nature of bidders. Furthermore, in selecting the ultimate SP for each PPP, a weighted 
approach is probably preferable in Malta as it permits enhanced focus on technical 
criteria and objectivity.  
With respect to the effectiveness of monitoring, the study concludes that negotiation 
abilities to settle conflicts and adequate training for the involved Government staff 
are even here important requisites. Furthermore, PPP contracts do not as yet provide 
for unrestricted access to SP records and thus they do not facilitate their public 
sector auditing. Finally, the various approaches towards monitoring in PPP contracts 
give rise to variations in terms of frequency and extent of details. Such 
inconsistencies may act as a further barrier to effective monitoring of PPP contracts.  
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Reference was made to the three elements of oxygen, fuel, and heat for fires to fully 
start. In the same manner, it is hoped that this study has amply proved the point that 
all three elements of definability, formulation and monitoring of PPP contracts are 
essential if PPPs are to be successful future vehicles for public sector development. 
After all, as argued by one expert in the study, “PPPs in Malta are separate species as 
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